Interpreting Kentucky State Law, Time Spent in Security Screenings After Clocking Out is Not Compensable

Vance v. Amazon.com, Inc. et al. - Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals


Facts:  Tina and Aaron Vane (collectively referred to as "the Vances") worked at an Amazon.com warehouse fulfillment center in Kentucky.  Tina was an employee of Amazon and Aaron was a joint employee of Amazon and Kelly Services, a staffing agency.  Amazon tracked its workers hours with a time clock and had employees clock in at the beginning of a shift and clock out at the end of the workday.  However, before employees that had clocked out could leave, Amazon required them to go through a theft prevention security screening.  Employees went through a metal detector and security guards inspected bags and personal items.  If an employee set of the metal detector, a security guard would search them with a metal detecting wand.  Apparently, this screening took anywhere from 10 to 30 minutes.  The Vances were never paid overtime compensation for the time spent going through the security screening.

The Vances filed suit against Amazon and Kelly Services on the grounds that the companies violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the Kentucky Wages and Hours Act ("KWHA").  While Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, a case that dealt with similar issues, was pending before the United States Supreme Court, this case was stayed pending a ruling on Busk.  With a ruling from the Supreme Court that time spent in security screenings was noncompensable, Vane withdrew the FLSA claims but maintained that the KWHA claim was still viable.  The district court granted judgment for the defendants and the Vances subsequently appealed.

Holding:  At its core, the FLSA establishes a minimum wage and overtime compensation pay structure for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.  However, under the Portal to Portal Act, an employee's principal activities are compensable, but conduct an employee engages in before and after the activities is not.  "Principal activities" have been held to include all activities which are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activity.  (Seems a bit redundant, huh?  Let's clarify this one then).  In short, an activity is "integral and indispensable" to the work an employee was hired to do if it is a component of that work and he cannot complete the work without it.  

When the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Busk, it held that post shift security screenings were not "integral and indispensable" to that job.  As a result, the screenings were postliminary to the employees' principal activities and therefore excluded from compensation pursuant to the Portal to Portal Act.

In this case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the KWHA was analogue to the FLSA.   However, the Vances argued that the KWHA does not refer to "principal activity", "preliminary" or "postliminary" acts nor has Kentucky adopted the "preliminary" and "postliminary" provisions of the Portal to Portal Act (although other portions of the Portal to Portal Act had been expressly adopted).  With that being said, the Court of Appeals noted that "absent a clear indication that the General Assembly [the Kentucky Legislature] considered the revision and deliberately rejected it," no conclusion can be drawn that the lack of Portal to Portal Act language demonstrates legislative intent to exclude compensation limits from Kentucky wage and hour laws.  Although the KWHA does not include "preliminary" and "postliminary" language, Kentucky's Commissioner of Workplace Standards (who has been charged with issuing regulations "defining and governing" the KWHA), the Commissioner has concluded that the Portal to Portal Act's exemptions are part of the KWHA framework.  Consequently, the Court found that since the KWHA's regulations are "substantially similar" to the FLSA, the KWHA incorporates the Portal to Portal Act's compensation limits on preliminary and postliminary activities.

Judgment:  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed judgment in favor of the employers on the grounds that Kentucky state law, which was held to be analogue to the FLSA, provided that time that hourly employees spent in security screening lines after the employee clocked did not amount to compensable time.

The Takeaway:  It has been some time since I have come across a donning and doffing case, but with the Supreme Court having handed down the Busk opinion back in 2014, that has likely settled the matter for the time being.  With that being said, it does not necessarily surprise me that a few of these cases are still making their way up to a Court of Appeals, especially when a state statute is being interpreted.  It goes without saying that every case has a different set of facts that a particular plaintiff is thinking would differentiate it from Busk...all it takes is one case to create new law (or at the very least create a carve out from Busk, even if it is just at the state level with a relevant state statute).  Unfortunately for those hoping that this case would do just that, that was not the situation.

I think the Court got this one right, given the fact that the KWHA was held to be analogue to the FLSA (which the Supreme Court had already held did not provide for employees to be compensated for time spent in security screening lines after clocking out).  Had the Sixth Circuit not found the two statutes to be similar (or had the Kentucky Legislature specifically carved out exceptions from the Portal to Portal Act in regard to interpretation of the KWHA), this case might have had a different holding. 

Majority Opinion Judge:  Judge Griffin

Date:  March 31, 2017

Opinion:  hr.cch.com/ELD/VanceAmazon033117.pdf