Alleged Marital Status Discrimination Against a Religious Employer By an Unmarried Pregnant Employee? That Could Spell Trouble For the Employer...

Richardson v. Northwest Christian University - United States District Court for the District of Oregon Eugene Division

Facts:  Coty Richardson ("Richardson") worked for Northwest Christian University ("Northwest") as a professor of exercise science.  At Northwest, there was an expectation of its faculty to adhere to "Biblical Christianity".  In fact, Northwest only hired Christian faculty with an expectation that the faculty would integrate their Christian faith into their jobs.  Although Northwest did not have a written policy that addressed employees' sexual conduct, Northwest took the position that its policy requires faculty to live their lives in conformity with Biblical Christianity which includes a prohibition against [o]n going cohabitation and sexual relations outside of marriage."  In the Faculty Handbook, there was a provision that stated cause for termination would occur for professional incompetence, failure to meet performance responsibilities, moral delinquency, or lack of commitment to the mission of Northwest. 

When Richardson applied for the position, she had two children although this was not disclosed to her supervisors or coworkers (although Dennis Lindsay, Vice President of Academic Affairs, who conducted the interview assumed she was unmarried with children).  After working at Northwest for four years and receiving uniformly positive performance review ratings, she learned she was pregnant with her third child.  Upon informing Northwest in order to coordinate maternity leave, Northwest gave Richardson three options:  1) stop living with the father of her child; 2) marry the father of her child; or 3) lose her job.  After Richardson refused the first two options, Northwest terminated her.

Richardson subsequently filed suit against Northwest on the grounds of discrimination on the basis of sex, pregnancy, and marital status and state law claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Holding:  (Note, this analysis looks only at the pregnancy/sex discrimination and marital status discrimination portions of the claim).  The Court began its analysis with a recognition that Richardson had separate claims of discrimination against Northwest that were subject to the motions for summary judgment.

Pregnancy/Sex Discrimination

Richardson's state and federal discrimination claims were analyzed by the Court in the same way, given that Oregon's employment discrimination statute was modeled after Title VII.  In this instance, Richardson could prove discrimination by showing disparate impact ("practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation").  Based upon the facts of this case, the Court held that Richardson could not meet her burden in regard to disparate impact.  Richardson's claim that Northwest's extramarital sex/cohabitation policy was facially discriminatory because it "treat[ed] pregnant women different from non-pregnant unmarried women" failed because the policy did not expressly differentiate on the basis of a protected trait.  

However, the Court recognized that Richardson could proceed with her pregnancy discrimination claim only if the record contained evidence from which a jury could conclude Northwest intended to discriminate against her on the basis of pregnancy.  The Court held that under the McDonnell Douglas test, since Richardson had met her burden and established a plausible inference of discriminatory intent based upon the record, the burden shifted to Northwest to establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her.  Although employers in Oregon may subject their employees to morality requirements and have broad authority to fire at will, that authority is subject to limits.  However, a prohibition on extramarital sex/cohabitation does not automatically constitute pregnancy discrimination under Title VII.  Therefore, the Court held the burden swung back to Richardson.  In further analyzing the record, the Court noted that Northwest's policy could lead to disproportionate enforcement against pregnant women.  As well, Northwest apparently knew that Richardson was an unmarried mother of two when she was hired, yet only inquired about her compliance with the extramarital sex/cohabitation policy when she disclosed her pregnancy with the third child.  Based upon the record, the Court held that neither party was entitled to summary judgment on the pregnancy discrimination claims.

Marital Status Discrimination

The Court noted that the question of whether terminating an employee for cohabitation constituted martial status discrimination under Oregon law, was a matter of first impression.  When looking at the relevant statute, the Court wrote that the statute was relatively ambiguous and could lend itself to either party's interpretation.  As a result, the Court turned sexual orientation discrimination cases for guidance.  Pointing to the landmark Lawrence v. Texas United States Supreme Court case and the concurrence written by Justice O'Connor, the Court recognized that a policy against extramarital sex/cohabitation effectively discriminated on the basis of marital status.  Without a public policy in Oregon prohibiting sex outside of marriage and the facts in the record, the District Court held that Oregon's marital status discrimination law makes it illegal for an employer to impose a policy that prohibits extramarital sex/cohabitation.

Judgment:  The District Court denied the cross motions for summary judgment in regard to Richardson's pregnancy/sex discrimination claims on the grounds that sufficient facts had been presented in which a juror could find for either party, necessitating the denial of summary judgment for either Richardson or Northwest.  However, Richardson was entitled to summary judgment on her claim of marital status discrimination, based upon the unlawful conduct of Northwest in regard to its policy of prohibiting extramarital sex/cohabitation among its faculty.

The Takeaway:  This was a groundbreaking case for several reasons, but namely that it was an issue of first impression in Oregon (in regard to marital status discrimination claims).  It is important to note that while the Court acknowledged that religious employers can prefer to hire employees on the basis of shared religion, that did not give these employers (or any employers for that matter), an exemption from a claim of marital status discrimination.  Based upon the facts in this case, Richardson was able to establish the basis of a valid marital status discrimination claim, based upon the conduct and policies in place at Northwest.  

With that being said, I am a bit surprised that Richardson was able to prevail on her summary judgment claim here (given the relatively low threshold normally needed to overcome summary judgment).  Given that this was an issue of first impression, however, I suppose the Court had the latitude to consider the claims made, undisputed facts, and interpret sexual orientation discrimination claims to reach its conclusion.

Majority Opinion Judge:  Judge Aiken

Date:  March 16, 2017

Opinion:  hr.cch.com/eld/RichardsonNorthwest031617.pdf