Jury Verdict That Relied Upon Circumstantial Evidence, Rather Than Direct, Sufficient to Uphold Title VII National Origin Discrimination Verdict Against Employer

Vega v. Chicago Park District - Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Facts:  Lydia Vega (“Vega”), who is Hispanic, worked for the Chicago Park District (“Park District”) beginning in 1987 and was promoted to park supervisor in 2004.  In September 2011, the Park District received an anonymous call which accused Vega of “theft of time.”  A Park District supervisor began surveillance Vega’s car thereafter.  A few days later, another anonymous call was received again accusing Vega of theft of time.  Another investigator began a separate and simultaneous investigation of Vega.  Over 56 days, Vega was surveillance 252 times.  During that timeframe, Vega was apparently interrupted at work in front of her coworkers with the investigators asking her questions in regard to the investigation.

In March of 2012, the investigators met with Vega and her union representative.  By that time, Vega was experiencing significant anxiety and took medical leave in late March on advice of her physician.  Between July and August of 2012, Vega received two separate Corrective Action Meeting notices that accused her of timesheet falsification.  After sending each notice, Mary Saieva (“Saieva”), the Park District’s Human Resources Manager, met with Vega and her union representative.  Saieva apparently did not listen to Vega’s explanations or review documents that Vega brought to dispute the allegations.  Afterward, Saieva called Elizabeth Millan (“Millan”), Vega’s former supervisor, to discuss the discrepancy in Vega’s timesheets.  Millan informed Saieva that Millan might have asked Vega to work form home on at least one occasion, which would explain one of the timesheet discrepancies.

Convinced that Vega was guilty, Saieva recommended Vega’s employment be terminated.  (This was apparently in violation of the Park District’s commitments under its union agreement, as Saieva did not consult with Vega’s then-supervisor nor recommend any progressive discipline.)  Saieva told Michael Simpkins (“Simpkins”) of the decision that Simpkins subsequently terminated Vega after receiving Saieva’s recommendation.  Vega’s termination letter stated she was fired for eleven timesheet falsifications and for being untruthful during the Corrective Action Meetings.  In a violation of its union commitments, the Park District did not offer Vega’s union a pre-disciplinary agreement.

Vega subsequently brought suit against the Park District under Title VII and 42 U.S..C. Section 1983 and alleged discrimination on the basis of national origin.  The Park District’s motion for judgment as a matter of law was denied.  A jury subsequently returned a verdict for Vega on her Title VII and Section 1983 claims, but ruled in favor of the Park District as to Vega’s retaliation claim.  The district court granted the Park District’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and found in favor of the Park District as to the Section 1983 claim but denied the request as to the jury verdict in favor of Vega as to the Title VII claim.  The Park District appealed every ruling it lost except for Vega’s reinstatement; Vega asked the Court of Appeals to reverse the district court’s judgment as a matter of law on the Section 1983 claim.

Holding:  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that in a Title VII case, “the sole question that matters” is “[w]hether a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plaintiff] would have kept h[er] job if [s]he had a different ethnicity, and everything else had remained the same.”  A plaintiff is able to prove discrimination through circumstantial evidence, as “[d]irect evidence—an overt admission of discriminatory intent—is rare.”

Turning to the facts of this case, the Court recognized that Vega based her claim on circumstantial evidence.  The Park District’s jump straight to termination was found to be contrary to Vega’s long, favorable record, but the rapid termination violated multiple union commitments.  “[S]ignificant, unexplained, or systematic deviations from established policies or practices” can be probating of discriminatory intent.

In addition to the arguments Vega presented to rebut the investigations, evidence was presented to the jury that the Park District mistreated other Hispanic employees.  Millan, Vega’s former supervisor, testified that she was assigned to “rough” parks on purpose while another Hispanic employee testified that she retired after a police officer told her the Park District investigators were watching her.  As well, Vega also had evidence that the Park District disciplined Hispanics more harshly than other groups.  For instance, between 2005 and 2012, no Caucasian park supervisors were fired, yet 17.6% of the Park District’s Hispanic park supervisors were terminated during that same period.  Perhaps most troubling was the fact that evidence was presented that while Vega was terminated, a Caucasian park supervisor accused of a similar violation was not punished even though she had lied on her timesheets.

The Park District argued that Vega’s Title VII claim failed because she had allegedly failed to show a causal link between the discrimination and her termination.  The Park District’s argument went as follows:  any discrimination that might have occurred was on the part of the investigators, not the decisionmakers.  Therefore, as Vega had allegedly presented no evidence that Simpkins or any other member of the Park District’s Board personally discriminated against her, the Park District argued that there was no evidence of a decisionmaker discriminating against her because of her national origin.  The Court was unswayed, however, noting that regardless of whether Simpkins or the Board was the “final decisionmaker” in the termination process, the dispositive question was whether the discriminatory animus of the investigators and Saieva was a proximate cause of the termination decision.

Judgment:  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a reasonable juror could have found the circumstantial evidence that the terminated employee presented to be compelling, and therefore the jury verdict would not be disturbed which found the employer had discriminated against the terminated employee on the basis of her national origin.

The Takeaway:  This is a well written opinion and worth a read for those looking for more of the Court’s analysis of the matter.  I will point out that employers should use this case as a timely reminder that all adverse employment actions should be consistent with whatever policies and procedures you have in place.  The Court was quick to point out that several of the Park District’s actions were in violation of union commitments...which was found to be evidence of discrimination.  Picking and choosing what policies and procedures to enforce (and which employees to enforce those against), might well prove to be fatal should a lawsuit arise over an employment decision such as they one in this case.  Be careful.

Majority Opinion Judge:  Judge Barrett

Date:  April 7, 2020

Opinion:  http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2020/D04-07/C:19-1939:J:Barrett:aut:T:fnOp:N:2498012:S:0