Earlier this morning, the United States Supreme Court handed down a unanimous ruling in Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, holding that an employee does not necessarily have "actual knowledge", under Section 1113(2), of the information contained in disclosures that are received but in which the employee does not read or recall reading. Consequently, the Court held that to meet the "actual knowledge" requirement, the employee must have in fact become aware of that information.
Taking a step back here, I had previously written about the case, prior to oral arguments. The case itself involved a claim by Christopher Sulyma ("Sulyma"), a former engineer at Intel, that the retirement plans offered by the company had imprudently over allocated funds to alternative investments (in violation of the plan administrators' fiduciary duties.) Intel argued that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, as the information about the investments of the retirement plans had previously been provided to Sulyma. Sulyma had apparently visited the links provided in the e-mails but could not remember whether he had actually read them. (Generally speaking, there is a six year statute of limitations in which to bring a claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), such as Sulyma's. However, that statute of limitations can be narrowed to three years, if the claimant had "actual knowledge of the breach or violation." As a result, if it can be shown that the claimant had actual knowledge, suit must be brought no more than three years after "the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation." In this case, Sulyma's suit came more than three years after he had been provided the information.)
The District Court granted Intel's motion for summary judgment, holding that Sulyma had actual knowledge by way of Intel's delivery of the information about the retirement plans, thereby triggering the three year statute of limitations. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that although Sulyma had been provided the information more than three years before suit was filed, it could not be established he actually read the information (therefore lacking "actual knowledge.)
The Supreme Court noted that while ERISA's "plain and unambiguous statutory language" must be enforced "according to its terms", ERISA did not define "actual knowledge." As a result, the Court found that "actual knowledge" must be given its plain meaning. After a review of the meaning of "actual knowledge", as set forth in the dictionary, the Court found that in order to have "actual knowledge", one must in fact be aware of it. While "constructive knowledge" will sometimes be imputed to a person that fails to learn something that a reasonably diligent person would have learned, the Court pointed out that Congress had failed to add to the language of Section 1113(2) to include both "actual" and "constructive" knowledge. Turning to the facts of this case, Justice Alito (delivering the opinion for the Court), wrote that it could not be shown that Sulyma had "actual knowledge" such that the three year statute of limitations would be triggered. While the relevant information was apparently disclosed to Sulyma, more than evidence of disclosure is required to establish "actual knowledge." As a result, to meet the "actual knowledge" requirement, it must be shown that the claimant had in fact become aware of the information. The Court therefore affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling in favor of Sulyma.
For a copy of the Court's opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-1116_h3cj.pdf
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