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Breaking: U.S. Supreme Court Holds that Catholic Elementary School Teachers Cannot Sue for Employment Discrimination


Hold onto your horses, britches, hat, or whatever else you want to throw in here.  The U.S. Supreme Court has been busy today, issuing a pair of relevant employment law decisions.  Following up on the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania from earlier today, the Supreme Court also issued a decision in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berry and held that Catholic elementary teachers are barred from suing their employers for employment discrimination under the “ministerial exception” of the First Amendment.

This case arose out of two lawsuits filed by elementary teachers working at Catholic schools.  Agnes Morrissey-Berry taught at Our Lady of Guadalupe School for nearly two decades before she was told her contract would not be renewed.  She subsequently sued her employer on the grounds that she was a victim of age discrimination.  The lawsuit was thrown out on the grounds that the “ministerial exception” applied and therefore she could not sue her employer for discrimination.  (In broad terms, the “ministerial exception” provides that religious institutions have control over whom them employ as “ministers”.  As a result, if a religious institution wants to terminate a “minister”, it may do so without risk of facing a discrimination claim for that employment decision.). The second lawsuit was filed by Kristen Biel against St. James School.  She claimed that after disclosing to her employer that she was being treated for cancer, her contract was not renewed.  She thereafter filed suit on the grounds that her employer discriminated against her because of her cancer.  Her lawsuit was also thrown out on the grounds that the “ministerial exception” applied.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated both cases and found that the “ministerial exception” normally applies only when an employee plays a “religious leadership” role.  Both teachers’ work was held to play a more limited role as they mostly taught religion from a book and therefore the Court of Appeals held that the “ministerial exception” did not apply and the discrimination lawsuits against their employers could proceed.

Writing for the 7 - 2 majority, Justice Samuel Alito recognized that the First Amendment bars the government from interfering in the right of churches and other religious organizations in their ability to decide issues relating to their faith and doctrine.  Consequently, Justice Alito noted that religious institutions should be able to make their own decisions about how they are run, which includes “the selection of individuals who play certain key roles.”  In order to determine whether the “ministerial exception” applies, “a variety of factors may be important.”  Of note, whether a religious institution calls an employee a “minister” is not dispositive of whether the “ministerial exception” applies.  “What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does.”  As teachers, Justice Alito held that “they were the members of the school staff who were entrusted most directly with the responsibility of educating their students in the faith”; “they were also excepted to guide their students, by word and deed, toward the goal of living their lives in accordance with their faith.”

Although the teachers may not have been officially designated as “ministers”, “their core responsibilities as teachers of religion were essentially the same.”  Justice Alito paid heed to the fact that the schools considered the teachers “as playing a vital part in carrying out the mission of the church” and recognized that the schools’ view counted.  As a result, the majority opinion held that that “ministerial exception” applied in this case and teachers at religious schools could lawfully be prohibited from suing their employers for discrimination.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion (joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch) and held that the majority opinion should have gone further and held that if a religious organization labeled an employee as a minister, courts should defer to that designation.  (If you recall, the majority opinion held that this designation alone should not dictate the outcome of whether the “ministerial exception applies.)  Justice Sonya Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion (joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg) and argued that the majority opinion would allow teachers to be “fired for any reason,” even though they “taught primarily secular subjects, lacked substantial religious titles and training, and were not even required to be Catholic.”  Justice Sotomayor went on to suggest that the Court’s decision could extend to “countless coaches, camp counselors, nurses, social-service workers, in-house lawyers, media-relations personnel, and many others who work for religious institutions.”

No matter how you cut it, this case coupled with Little Sisters of the Poor should be chalked up as major victories today for religious institutions and those private employers with moral or religious objections to birth control mandates.



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