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The FLSA, Attorney’s Fees, & What Qualifies As The ‘Prevailing Party’


Fast v. Cash Depot Ltd. - United States District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin


Facts:  Timothy Fast (“Fast”) filed suit against his former employer Cash Depot Ltd. (“Cash”) on the grounds that Cash failed to pay himself and other similarly situated employees overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).  After retaining counsel, Cash reviewed its records and determined that these employees were in fact due additional compensation for their overtime work.  Cash proceeded to tender these employees the additional compensation and then asked the Court dismiss Fast’s case.  The Court denied the motion to dismiss in part because Fast disputed whether the appropriate amount of compensation had actually been paid.  While the Court recognized that a class action claimant such as Fast could decline an offer to settle for the full value of his individual claim so as to not render the class action moot, the Court pointed it that if Cash had remedied the FLSA violation, the claim should be resolved.

Fast proceeded to file a motion asking his attorney’s fees and costs of approximately $50,000.00 be paid by Cash on the grounds that Fast was the ‘prevailing party’ and therefore the FLSA’s mandatory attorney’s fees provision applied.  Cash moved for summary judgment and asked the Court to dismiss the case.

Holding:  Under the FLSA, an award of attorney’s fees is mandatory to the prevailing party.  The Court took note of prior caselaw which has held that “[t]he FLSA plainly requires that the plaintiff receive a judgment in his favor to be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.”  The United States Supreme Court has held that a “prevailing party” is “one that has been afforded some relief by the court.”  However, “a defendant’s voluntary change in conduct...lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.”  Quite simply, without an actual ruling from the court which results in a judgment in favor of the claimant (or a court approving a consent decree or settlement agreement), a party is not entitled to have its attorney’s fees paid by the other party in accordance with the FLSA’s mandatory attorney’s fees provision.

Cash argued that Fast was not a “prevailing party” as no judgment was rendered by the Court nor was the payment of the overtime wages a settlement that needed the Court’s approval.  Therefore, Cash asked the Court to dismiss the case and not award Fast any attorney’s fees or costs.  On the other hand, Fast based his argument on the claim that his lawsuit resulted in securing overtime wages for both himself and other similarly situated employees, which in essence made him a “prevailing party”.  As for the Supreme Court case which stipulated a judgment must be rendered to be a “prevailing party”, Fast argued that the Supreme Court case was inapplicable as it did not involve the FLSA, which he again reminded the Court includes a mandatory attorney’s fees provision.

In this instance, the Court found Fast’s arguments unpersuasive.  Although the Supreme Court case did not deal directly with the FLSA, the Court held that whether a statutory award of attorney’s fees is mandatory or discretionary is irrelevant if the plaintiff is not a prevailing party.  As noted in this case, Fast did not obtain a judicial ruling in his favor nor did Cash’s payment of overtime wages result in the Court approving a settlement.  Consequently, the Court held that Fast was not a “prevailing party” entitled to have his attorney’s fees paid by Cash.

Judgment:  The District Court denied the claimant’s request that his attorney’s fees be paid by his employer as a result of his FLSA claim for past due overtime wages, as the claimant was not a “prevailing party” as he did not obtain a judicial ruling in his favor nor did the employer’s voluntary payment of the overtime wages require Court approval.

The Takeaway:  Fascinating ruling from the Court, right?  This was more of a nuanced opinion that delved into relevant caselaw and statutory language, rather than an intensive fact analysis.  With that being said, it is interesting to note how the Court used the Supreme Court case and opinions from other circuits to establish what qualifies as a “prevailing party” that would be entitled to have its attorney’s fees paid under the FLSA.  When you parse the language of the statute and what happened in this case (or rather did not happen), I do not think it is a stretch to say that while Fast might have gotten what he wanted for himself and the other similarly situated employees, Cash voluntarily paying the overtime wages and no actual judgment actually having been rendered by the Court, Fast fell a bit short of being a “prevailing party” entitled to having his attorney’s fees awarded under the FLSA’s mandatory attorney’s fees provision.

Majority Opinion Judge:  Judge Griesbach

Date:  November 6, 2018

Opinion:  http://hr.cch.com/ELD/FastCash110718.pdf

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