Back in early 2015, I pointed readers to a case in Rhode Island that was thought to be the first to invoke the anti discrimination provisions of Rhode Island's medical marijuana law. That law, known as the Hawkins-Slater Act, provides that "No school, employer, or landlord may refuse to enroll, employ, or lease to, or otherwise penalize, a person solely for his or her status as a [medical marijuana] cardholder." After long last, this case has been decided by the Court.
Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics - Rhode Island Superior Court
Facts: Christine Callaghan ("Callaghan") sought an internship with Darlington Fabrics ("Darlington") in conjunction with a Master's program she was a part of that the University of Rhode Island. On June 30, 2014, Callaghan met with Darlington's Human Resources Coordinator Karen McGrath to discuss the internship. At that meeting, Callaghan signed Darlington's Fitness for Duty Statement in which Callaghan acknowledged she would have to take a drug test prior to being hired. During the course of the meeting, Callaghan disclosed that she held a medical marijuana card.
On July 2, 2014, McGrath and a colleague held a conference call with Callaghan and asked Callaghan if she was currently using medical marijuana. Callaghan stated that she was. As a result, Callaghan noted she would test positive on her pre-employment drug test. McGrath informed Callaghan that a positive test would "prevent the Company from hiring her." Callaghan said she was allergic to many other painkillers and she would neither use marijuana or bring it into the workplace. That same afternoon, McGrath and her colleague subsequently informed Callaghan that Darlington was "unable to hire her" as a result of Callaghan's use of medical marijuana.
Callaghan filed suit against Callaghan on the grounds that Darlington violated the Hawkins-Slater Act by failing to hire her based upon her status as a medical marijuana card holder, Darlington violated the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, and Darlington's actions resulted in employment discrimination. Both Callaghan and Darlington subsequently moved for summary judgment.
Holding: The Court walked through the three parts of Callaghan's claim in an effort to carefully analyze the basis of all parts of the claim. In order to keep things clear, I will streamline this analysis.
A Private Cause of Action Does Exist Under the Hawkins-Slater Act
The Court began its analysis of the claim with a recognition that while the Hawkins-Slater Act does not provide an express private cause of action, the intent of the General Assembly could provide a framework to establish the existence of a private cause of action. After an in depth analysis of several canons of construction in regard to statutory interpretation of the Hawkins-Slater Act and a recognition that courts are reluctant to imply a private cause of action, the Court chose to liberally interpret the statute and pointed out that without a private cause of action being found to exist, the Hawkins-Slater Act would be meaningless.
Having survived the initial analysis, the Court turned to the language of the statute. As mentioned above, the statute provides "No school, employer, or landlord may refuse to enroll, employ, or lease to, or otherwise penalize, a person solely for his or her status as a cardholder." However, the statute further states that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to require...[a]n employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace." Prior precedent in Rhode Island has established that isolated portions of a statute cannot be viewed in a vacuum; rather, each word or phrase must be considered in the context of the entire statutory provision. In this case, the statute does not say that nothing in the Hawkins-Slater Act would require an employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana entirely. Rather, the statute only identifies the employer not be required to accommodate the use of medical marijuana in the workplace...which lead the Court to hold that a reasonable interpretation could be that the General Assembly required employers to accommodate the use of medical marijuana outside the workplace. (A bit confusing, right? More on this below.)
In this instance, the hiring of Callaghan would not require Darlington to make accommodations such as restructuring the job, modifying work schedules, or even modifying the existing drug and alcohol policy. Instead, while Darlington could lawfully regulate medical marijuana use by prohibiting Callaghan from being under the influence while on duty, Darlington could not discriminate against her by refusing to hire her simply because she was a medical marijuana user.
Rhode Island Civil Rights Act
The Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, as noted by the Court, is expansive and "provides broad protection against all forms of discrimination in all phases of employment." Based upon the facts in this case, Callaghan's status as a medical marijuana cardholder signaled to Darlington that she could not have obtained the card without a debilitating medical condition that caused her to be disabled. Consequently, whether or not Callaghan informed Darlington about her migraines (which was apparently the reason for her use of medical marijuana), the Court found there was no dispute that Darlington knew that her possession of a medical marijuana card indicated she was disabled. The fact that Darlington might not have known Callaghan's precise disability was found to be irrelevant by the Court. Based upon the relevant statute and facts in this case, it was enough to show that Darlington discriminated against a class of disabled people (medical marijuana cardholders) by refusing to hire Callaghan upon learning of her use of medical marijuana.
Judgment: The Rhode Island Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Callaghan on the grounds that she had established valid causes of action that Darlington unlawfully discriminated against her by refusing to hire her for an internship once Darlington learned that she was a medical marijuana cardholder.
The Takeaway: Quite the case, huh? Clever reference with the Court's tongue in cheek nod to an old Beatles song "I get high with a little help from my friends" at the start of the opinion. With that being said, this case has a potentially far reaching impact, given the relatively unclear interpretation of several medical marijuana discrimination cases across the country. This Court's holding, that an employer's enforcement of its neutral drug testing policy to deny employment to an applicant because she held a medical marijuana card, is a divergence from how other courts have ruled on similar cases. As always, this is why it is vital to consult with the law in your particular state in order to know how courts analyze a given employment or labor law issue.
The Takeaway: Quite the case, huh? Clever reference with the Court's tongue in cheek nod to an old Beatles song "I get high with a little help from my friends" at the start of the opinion. With that being said, this case has a potentially far reaching impact, given the relatively unclear interpretation of several medical marijuana discrimination cases across the country. This Court's holding, that an employer's enforcement of its neutral drug testing policy to deny employment to an applicant because she held a medical marijuana card, is a divergence from how other courts have ruled on similar cases. As always, this is why it is vital to consult with the law in your particular state in order to know how courts analyze a given employment or labor law issue.
In addition, note how the Court parsed the language of the Hawkins-Slater Act to reach the conclusion that while the statute did not require employers to accommodate medical marijuana cardholders in the workplace, the statute could be read to require employers to accommodate medical marijuana cardholders outside the workplace. This was certainly a rather expansive reading of the statute...and one that I fear could prove to be a slippery slope going forward. How far might employers in Rhode Island have to go to accommodate an employee's medical marijuana use outside of work? While the Court took steps to narrow this liberal interpretation of the General Assembly's intent when writing the statute, I think the Court's ruling left too much uncertainty in this regard.
Majority Opinion Judge: Judge Licht
Date: May 23, 2017
Opinion: http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/superior-court/2017/14-5680.html
Date: May 23, 2017
Opinion: http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/superior-court/2017/14-5680.html
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