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The ADA Does NOT Require Employers to Grant On the Spot Accommodation Requests By Employees


Brumley v. United Parcel Service, Inc. - Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals


Facts:  Melissa Brumley (“Brumley”) worked at United Parcel Service (“UPS”) as a sorter.  This role involved taking small packages (weighing about 10 pound or less) from a conveyor belt and placing them in various slots depending upon their final destination.  Sorters were then required to bundle the packages into a bag and place them on trucks.  These bags could weigh up to 70 pounds, although Brumley acknowledged that she never lifted any 70 pound bags.  Brumley also served as a temporary driver on occasion to cover for sick or vacationing full time drivers.  This role required Brumley to potentially lift packages weighing up to 70 pounds.  Brumley stated that as a temporary driver, she had lifted 70 packages.

In December of 2015 while on a delivery route, Brumley injured her back while unloading packages from a truck and received workers’ compensation benefits.  In January of 2016, Brumley assumed a 30 day position at UPS to inspect package trucks.  At the end of this period, Brumley assumed temporary disability status and went on leave from work until July of 2016.  On July 26th, Brumley met with Dr. John Klekamp (“Klekamp”) who gave her two return to work notes that included work restrictions.  One note instructed Brumley to avoid lifting more than 30 pounds and to avoid pushing or pulling more than 30.5 pounds.  The second note stated that while Brumley could return to work on July 29th and could resume sorting, she could not drive.  When Brumley gave both notes to her supervisor, Richard Bonee (“Bonee”), he sent her home because she could not lift anything over 30 pounds.

Brumley proceeded to file grievances with her union thereafter on the grounds that she was improperly denied the right to work with permanent restrictions despite presenting UPS with a return to work note from her doctor.  UPS Occupational Health Supervisor Jurgen Rosner (“Rosner”) proceeded to send Brumley two medical forms that he asked for Dr. Klekamp and Brumley to complete so UPS could evaluate any restrictions and identify possible accommodations.  Rosner requested the forms be returned within two weeks, however Brumley did not return them for nearly a month.  It then took until mid October for Rosner and Human Resources Manager Elveta Cooper (“Cooper”) to meet with Brumley to discuss possible accommodations.  At the meeting, however, Brumley stated she she wanted to discontinue the Americans with Disabilities (“ADA”) interactive process and return to Dr. Klekamp to have him remove the restrictions.  On October 27th, Brumley had the restrictions removed and returned to work a few days later.

Brumley proceeded to file suit against UPS for failure to accommodate under the ADA, disability discrimination under the ADA, a claim for workers’ compensation retaliation, a claim for denial of right to leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, and a claim for disability discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act and Tennessee Disability Act.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS as to all claims.  Brumley appealed.

Holding:  Under the ADA, discrimination is prohibited “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to...[the] terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”  Discrimination can include failing to make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual, so long as the requested accommodation does not impose an undue hardship on the employer.   A claimant can establish a prima facile case of discrimination by showing that (1) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she was otherwise qualified for her position, with or without reasonable accommodation, (3) the employer knew or had reason to know of the disability, (4) she requested an accommodation, and (5) the employer failed to provide the necessary accommodation.

The Court was quick to note that an ADA discrimination claim that is premised upon an employer’s failure to offer a reasonable accommodation necessarily involves direct evidence.  Therefore, once an ADA claimant, Brumley, establishes that the employer, UPS, failed to accommodate the known disability,  the employer has the burden to prove the proposed accommodation imposed an j due hardship upon the employer.

The district court held that even if Brumley could establish the first four elements, she could not establish that UPS failed to grant her accommodation request as Brumley had voluntarily abandoned the interactive process.  Therefore, the district court found that Brumley lacked the direct evidence to show UPS was unwilling to accommodate a permanent restriction.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court and noted that the ADA does not require employers to make on the spot accommodations of an employee’s choosing.  Rather, the ADA requires employers to engage in an interactive process with the employee to “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”  As the interactive process is mandatory, UPS had no legal obligation to place Brumley in a sort position on the same day she returned to work.  UPS had discretion to provide a reasonable accommodation via the interactive process; however, Brumley’s voluntary withdrawal from the process ended the Court’s analysis of any alleged shortcoming by UPS.

As for the claim by Brumley that she was coerced into abandoning the interactive process by a supervisor, the Court found no sufficient evidence was produced by Brumley to substantiate this claim.  

Judgment:  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of UPS on the grounds that the employer had no duty to provide an on the spot accommodation request made by a disabled employee, without first engaging in the mandatory interactive process, which the employee was found to have voluntarily withdrawn from.

The Takeaway:  As we round out the year, this is a good ADA case to highlight.  Note that the Court of Appeals is NOT saying that the accommodation requested by Brumley was not reasonable.  On the other hand, nor is the Court saying that the accommodation requested by Brumley would create an undue hardship on UPS.  Rather, the Court of Appeals has delineated matters to establish that the minute a disabled employee makes an accommodation request, the employer is not required to grant it on the spot.  Rather, as provided by the ADA, the parties are to enter into the interactive process to determine whether the requested accommodation is feasible.  Employers and employees alike would be wise to follow the interactive process as prescribed in the ADA...straying too far from the interactive process, in a case such as this when an employee wanted an on the spot granting of her requested accommodation, likely will not get far.

Majority Opinion Judge:  Judge McKeague

Date:  November 30, 2018

Opinion:  http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0258p-06.pdf

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