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Shortening An Employee's Work Hours Can Be a Reasonable Accommodation For Religious Needs


Smith v. Concetra, Inc. - United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division


Facts:  Timika Smith ("Smith") worked as a front office specialist for Concentra Health Services, Inc. ("Concentra") in Chicago.  In her position, Smith was responsible for greeting patients and visitors, admitting and checking on patients, obtaining authorizations to process patients for needed services, answering phones, and assisting in performing patient drug screenings.  Smith initially worked from 7 AM to 4 PM, which gave her time to pick up her daughter from school on occasion before going to her daily religious program meetings that began between 4 PM and 6 PM.  However, when a new director, Carla Lowe ("Lowe"), began work at Concentra, Smith's shift was changed from 9 AM to 6 PM on the grounds that a front office specialist was not needed before 9 AM because medical assistants could perform the front office specialist's functions until 9 AM and more staff were needed later in the day when it got busier.

Smith informed Lowe that she could not work past 4 PM because she had to pick up her daughter on occasion and attend her religious program meetings.  However, after Smith was offered an opportunity to take a break to fulfill her prayer accommodations, she was ultimately offered a 9 AM to 4 PM work schedule to accommodate the religious schedule.  Under this proposed accommodation, Smith would be allowed to keep her full time benefits but would only work 30 hours per week.  Smith asked to work as a medical assistant on the 7 AM to 4 PM shift but was told this was not possible as Smith was not certified to act as a medical assistant.

After accepting the new shift, Smith was injured in a car accident a few months later.  When she returned to work, she complained she could not perform the drug screenings because a wrist brace interfered with her ability to unscrew specimen cap lids.  Upon providing a doctor's note stating she was unable to use her left hand, Smith was required to take FMLA leave.  After several miscommunications, Smith failed to return to work at the end of her leave and was terminated.  Smith subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").  Upon receiving a notice of her right to sue, Smith filed suit in District Court.  Concentra subsequently moved for summary judgment on all of Smith's claims.

Holding:  (Note, this analysis only looks at the religious discrimination portion of Smith's lawsuit).  In her suit, Smith alleged that she was discriminated against based upon her religion and as a result of Concentra's failure to provide her with a reasonable accommodation.  For those unfamiliar with the standard of proof to prevail on a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation claim, the plaintiff must show:  1) that the observance or practice conflicting with an employment requirement is religious in nature; 2) that she called the religious observance or practice to her employer's attention; and 3) that the religious observance or practice was the basis for her discharge or other discriminatory treatment.  If all three prongs are established, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to establish a reasonable accommodation for the religious practice or to show that any reasonable accommodation would result in undue hardship.

The District Court noted that a dispute could exist as to whether Smith's refusal to work past 4 PM was motivated by the requirement of her religious beliefs as opposed to her need to pick her daughter up from school.  Regardless, the Court turned immediately to the third prong and held that the undisputed facts established that Concentra reasonably accommodated Smith's religious practices.

The United States Supreme Court has long held that a reasonable accommodation is one that "eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices."   Of course, a reasonable accommodation need not be an employee's preferred accommodation or the most beneficial accommodation for an employee.  Once an employer offers an alternative that reasonably accommodates the employee's religious needs, the statutory inquiry is deemed to be at an end.  In this case, although Smith's work hours were originally from 7 AM to 4 PM, Concentra had a need to change the work schedule to better staff its facility.  Upon learning from Smith that these new hours were not viable as a result of her personal and religious obligations, Concentra allowed Smith to then leave work at 4 PM.  This proposed accommodation eliminated the conflict between Smith's schedule and her religious obligations.  As a result, the Court held this was a reasonable accommodation to Smith in regard to her religious needs

As for Smith's contention that the 9 AM to 4 PM work schedule was not a reasonable accommodation of her religious needs because it shortened her workday by two hours and diminished her pay, the Court noted that there was no authority to rely upon which would show that reasonable accommodations permit an employee to work as many hours as they otherwise would be entitled to work.  In regard to Smith's claim that Concentra should have accommodated her in a different manner so she could work her previous schedule, the Court pointed out that once a reasonable accommodation has been made, no further inquiry into other possible reasonable accommodations is required.

Judgment:  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on the grounds that upon becoming aware of the employee's religious needs, a reasonable accommodation was offered to the employee to accommodate her religious practices.  Although this reasonable accommodation resulted in fewer working hours (and less pay) for the employee, the fact that the employee wanted another accommodation offered so she would not lose pay was not controlling on the employer.

The Takeaway:  Not only was this case fascinating to read through, but highly relevant for many employers and HR personnel.  Religious accommodation cases come along often enough but not many stand out.  With that being said, I wanted to highlight this case for readers to re-emphasize that courts are prone to look at the facts of a case and hold that once a reasonable accommodation is made, the employer has met their burden (and any further inquiry is not needed, as noted by the Supreme Court).  Even in cases such as this, where the employee would lose pay as a result of the accommodation offered, that does not prevent a court from holding the accommodation to be reasonable.  

Of course, had the District Court chosen to create new law and found that reasonable accommodations permit an employee to work as many hours as they otherwise would be entitled to work, this case might have been decided differently.  However, with no willingness to go there (or any other court apparently having chosen to do so either), Smith's religious discrimination claim was bound to end in summary judgment in favor of Concentra.

Majority Opinion Judge:  Judge Coleman

Date:  March 1, 2017

Opinionhr.cch.com/eld/SmithConcnetra030117.pdf

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